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CIVIL COMMITMENT AND THE DOCTRINE
OF BALANCE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Julian R. Friedman*
Robert W. Daly**
INTRODUCTION
That form of political order which we call "liberal democ-
racy" guarantees, as a matter of fundamental principle, that all
citizens shall enjoy personal liberty under the full and equal pro-
tection of the law. Any exception to this principle constitutes a
serious challenge to the principle itself. It is therefore necessary
to justify any departure from the guarantees of liberty and equal-
ity by pointing to a clear and unassailable justification for sus-
pending the liberty of the citizen and for denying him or her equal
treatment under the law.'
At present, the confinement and detention of persons with-
out their consent is authorized by civil mental hygiene codes and
by the courts in virtually every state and federal jurisdiction. We
submit that such codes and court decisions are, in general, in-
compatible with the tenets of liberal democracy and more partic-
ularly with the constitutional order.2
Current codes and judicial decisions in the civil commitment
area seek to balance the rights of individuals against the interests
of society. But the balance is almost exclusively struck in favor
* Professor of Political Science, Syracuse University; B.S., Harvard Uni-
versity, 1942; M.A., Fletcher School, 1943; Ph.D., University of California at
Berkeley, 1957.
** Associate Professor of Psychiatry, State University of New York, Col-
lege of Medicine, Syracuse; Director, Adult Psychiatry Clinic, State University
Hospital, Syracuse; B.S., St. Lawrence University; M.D., State University of New
York, Syracuse, 1957.
1. While such a proposition is not contained per se in the Constitution, it
is implicit in that document and in our form of constitutional government. See
generally H. LASKI, LIBERTY IN THE MODERN STATE (1948); A.D. LINDSAY, THE
ESSENTIALS OF DEMOCRACY (1929); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF
DEMOCRACY (1966); J. TUSSMAN, OBLIGATION AND THE BODY POLITIC (1960).
2. The authors wish to acknowledge the important contributions to this
subject area by Dr. Thomas Szasz, author of LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY
(1963) and IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY (1970), and Dr. Ronald Leifer, author of
IN THE NAME OF MENTAL HEALTH: THE SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PSYCHIATRY
(1969). The deliberations of the New York Civil Liberties Union Committee
on the Liberties of Mental Patients, chaired by Dean George Alexander, helped
shape the views of Professor Friedman.
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of the state and its paternalistic role as protector of the mentally
ill. The importance of the individual rights involved seems
not to be recognized.
We assert that freedom from commitment to a mental institu-
tion is a fundamental civil liberty which must be protected by the
courts as solicitously as are other civil liberties. Just as the Court
has seen fit to safeguard freedom to travel3 or freedom of associa-
tion4 from laws which restrict their full exercise, then, a fortiori, it
must protect those rights and others from total obliteration through
civil commitment. Still more basically, personal liberty itself-
freedom from physical confinement-must be recognized as the
most fundamental of all civil liberties.5
This article is an interdisciplinary evaluation of civil commit-
ment of the mentally ill, jointly authored by a psychiatrist and a
political scientist. While legal issues are and must be raised in this
context, this article does not attempt a detailed analysis of the
case law bearing on them. Its purpose is to challenge the as-
sumptions behind traditional commitment theory and to propose
a "civil libertarian" view of the rights of the mentally ill.
CONTEMPORARY CODES AND PRACTICES
There are a multitude of hopes and fears which animate the
public officials, professionals, and inmates who are associated
with mental health facilities. State and federal mental hygiene
codes,0 however, allow involuntary hospitalization for persons:
1. mentally ill or "suffering from mental disability result-
ing from mental disease, alcoholism, or addiction to narcotics";
2. mentally ill and "in need of involuntary care and treat-
ment";
3. mentally ill and requiring immediate inpatient care;
3. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405
U.S. 330 (1972).
4. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479 (1960).
5. For a thorough discussion of this argument and of Supreme Court cases
which have in the past given some recognition to the fundamental importance of
personal freedom, see Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Men-
tally Ill: Practical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV.
1107, 1155-1168 (1972).
6. Different formulae are found in the statutes of different states. See F.
MILLER, R. DAWSON, G. Dix, R. PARNAS, THE MENTAL HEALTH PROCESS (1971)
1510-1511 [Hereinafter cited as MILLER]; AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (F. Lindman & D. McIntyre eds. 1961)
[Hereinafter cited as LINDMAN & MCINTYRE]. For statutory definitions of "mental
illness" in the various states, see AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW (S. Brakel & R. Rock eds. 1971) 66-71 [Hereinafter cited
as BRAKEL & ROCK].
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4. mentally ill and "behaving in a manner which, in a per-
son who is not mentally ill, would be deemed disorderly conduct
which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others";
5. mentally ill and a danger to society;
6. mentally ill and a danger to himself.7
In practice, it is often the case that the individual is actually
arrested or apprehended by a law enforcement or health officer
and transported to a public safety building, jail, or hospital for
a psychiatric examination. Such a person may find himself de-
tained for a few hours or for life.8 In the midst of this be-
wildering experience, he is compelled to submit to physicians or
other civil authorities who are charged by law with detaining
him for brief or prolonged periods of time. In the various stages
of incarceration in a mental hospital, he enjoys few if any of the
constitutional safeguards commonly available to criminal de-
fendants at the time of their arrest, booking, arraignment, indict-
ment, preliminary hearing, trial, sentencing or imprisonment.9
The beleaguered, allegedly mad person may be treated
gently and humanely in circumstances which are very trying and
painful for all the concerned parties. Clearly, however, during
these encounters and proceedings, his liberty, especially freedom
of movement, stands in full jeopardy. As he is not formally
charged with criminal conduct but is instead alleged to be men-
tally ill, the situation is rarely defined as involving any transgres-
sion of constitutional rights.' 0  In actual practice, for persons
involuntarily committed, retention and restriction under the men-
tal hygiene codes are as confining as imprisonment and parole un-
der the criminal codes. It is the person who is hospitalized and
not just the "sick" aspect of the individual. It is the person who
is placed under the control and management of the police, the
hospital director, and the therapeutic team. To become mad is
to become almost a nonperson with respect to individual rights
and freedom.
7. BRAKEL & ROCK, supra note 6.
8. See note 11 infra.
9. For a complete description of the process of commitment, see J. KATz,
J. GOLDSTEIN, & A. DERSHOWITZ, PSYCHIATRY AND LAW (1967). Involuntary
civil commitment proceedings, properly viewed, raise serious questions of the de-
nial of rights under the first, fourth, sixth and fourteenth amendments to the
United States Constitution. However, courts have generally been reluctant to rec-
ognize these issues.
10. In Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 736-737 (1972), the Court recog-
nized the broad power traditionally exercised by the states to commit persons
found to be mentally ill. The Court found it surprising that substantive constitu-
tional limitations on this power had not been more frequently litigated, but did
not attempt to deal with such limitations.
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The recent use of informal and voluntary admissions and of
community mental health centers has by no means eliminated the
libertarian problem," nor has it been alleviated by routine habeas
corpus proceedings, by information sessions on the rights of patients
following incarceration, or by recent judicial decisions which have,
on equal protection grounds, invalidated procedures applicable to
psychiatric patients held in hospitals for the criminally insane."2
Modem commitment and retention practices involve acts of
legislators, findings of judges, and petitions of citizens; and the
activities of police, members of the psychiatric profession, and
mental health administrators. However, the question which is
raised in this article is not whether contemporary commitment and
retention practices are genuinely enlightened, progressive, or hu-
mane, but whether the practices authorized by these codes meet
the test of constitutional guarantees.
CONSTITUTIONAL RESPECTABILITY OF THE
MENTAL HYGIENE CODES
Mental hygiene codes and the administrative arrangements
which they inspire continue to enjoy constitutional respectability
despite their antilibertarian features. The state's paternalistic
role is widely accepted-courts at all levels have consistently
found it reasonable and legitimate for state and federal govern-
ments to use police power to protect their citizens' mental health
by various means, including the detention of those persons al-
legedly suffering from "mental illness."'" Although it has not
11. At the present time in most jurisdictions, patients remanded to mental
hospitals are released upon the discretion of the director of the hospital. The
patient, or others acting on his behalf, may have recourse to a hearing should
they choose to contest the hospital director's decision regarding retention. See,
e.g., NEw YORK MENTAL HYGIENE LAw §§ 31, 31.17, 31.31, 31.33 (McKinney
Supp. 1972). The New York provisions indicate that even patients admitted
under the informal or voluntary clauses of the law may find themselves incarcer-
ated for life through a series of legal steps initiated by the hospital director or
his agents. This means, of course, that any person seeking admission to a hos-
pital of the Department of Mental Hygiene of the State of New York places
himself in the hands of physicians with vast discretionary powers regarding his
liberty. An informal or voluntary admission can be converted by hospital
and court officials to a continuing involuntary admission.
The relative ease of commitment in many jurisdictions also creates the in-
voluntary "voluntary" patient-"If you don't choose to go voluntarily, we will
commit you." Hence, despite reforms, a libertarian problem continues.
12. See note 14, inlra.
13. Under the American system of federalism, the states exercise this police
power over their territories, while the federal government possesses an equiva-
lent jurisdiction over the District of Columbia and "Territory and other Prop-
erty belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; art. IV, § 3. As
to the reasonableness of the exercise of the police power by the states over the
mentally ill, see In re Colah [The Parsee Merchant Case], 3 Daly 529, 11 Abb.
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ruled directly on the constitutionality of civil mental hygiene
codes, the Supreme Court has relied heavily on the prcedures set
forth in those codes as the standard for extending equal protec-
tion to those prisoners convicted of criminal offenses who are de-
tained in hospitals for the criminally insane beyond the terms of
their criminal sentences. In such cases, equal protection requires
that the questions of the prisoner's sanity and dangerousness be de-
termined in conformity with proceedings applicable to those
civilly committed under state law.' 4 Recently, the Court reached
an analogous result in Jackson v. Indiana.'5 In that case Indiana
authorities detained an individual for over three years in an in-
stitution for the criminally insane pending his highly improb-
able recovery of competence to stand trial. The Court held that,
under equal protection, standards for commitment of those found
incompetent to stand trial may be no less stringent than general
civil commitment standards. These decisions, along with others
upholding compulsory treatment for narcotic addicts, 6 actually
may have enhanced the constitutional respectability of civil com-
mitment legislation. But it should be noted that the Supreme
Court actions did not result from a direct challenge to the con-
stitutionality of the civil mental hygiene codes as such. Deliv-
ering the opinion of the Court in the Jackson case and referring to
Pr. 209 (N.Y.C.P. 1871), and Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972). For
equivalent treatment of the exercise of police power over the District of Colum-
bia by the federal government, see Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
14. Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); United States ex rel. Schuster
v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969); Gomez v. Miller, 341 F. Supp. 323
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). In the Baxtrom case, the Court asserted the proposition
that "there is no conceivable basis for distinguishing the commitment of a per-
son who is nearing the end of a penal sentence from all other civil commitments."
383 U.S. at 111-12. In Gomez the court stated that "[elven if we assume, argu-
endo, that the Constitution does not require a jury trial to determine dangerous-
ness, New York, having granted it in all other cases, must justify the de-
nial to plaintiffs and it has failed to do so." 341 F. Supp. at 329.
15. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In the Jackson case the petitioner, Jackson, sought
release from the state hospital for the criminally insane where he was subject
to indefinite commitment solely on account of his lack of capacity to stand trial.
The Court held that by subjecting the petitioner to a more lenient commitment
standard and to a more stringent release standard then generally applicable to
those not charged with criminal offenses, and by thus condemning him to per-
manent institutionalization without the showing required for civil commitment,
Indiana deprived petitioner of equal protection of the laws under the four-
teenth amendment. The Court also held that indefinite commitment of a crimi-
nal defendant solely on account of his lack of capacity to stand trial violates
due process. Once it is determined that there is a substantial probability that
the defendant will not attain competency in the foreseeable future, the state must
either institute civil proceedings or release the defendant. For a more complete
discussion of Jackson, see Comment, An End to Incompetency to Stand Trial, 13
SANTA CLARA LAWYER 560 (1973).
16. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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the broad power of the state to commit persons alleged to be
"mentally ill," Justice Blackmun observed: "Considering the
number of persons affected, it is perhaps remarkable that the
substantive constitutional limitations on this power have not been
more frequently litigated.' 1 7  It is indeed remarkable that consti-
tutional respectability still attaches to mental hygiene codes con-
sidering their obvious defects: vagueness, lack of substantive
due process, denial of equal protection, and invasion of privacy.
Vagueness
The mental hygiene codes, because of uncertainty in the
meaning of their terms, appear to be so vague as to preclude ac-
curate determination of those who are subject to commitment
under their provisions. Such terms as "dangerousness," "need for
retention," and even "mental illness," are sufficiently ambigu-
ous to permit divergent interpretations without limit. For exam-
ple, the Wisconsin statute, adopting the model interstate com-
pact on mental health, describes mental illness as "mental di-
sease to such extent that a person so afflicted requires care and
treatment for his own welfare, or welfare of others, or of the
community."' 8  Unfortunately, such circular definitions of men-
tal illness are common to most state statutes.' 9 Typically, those
to be protected are identified by such vague terms as "society,"
"others," and "self." The meaning of "dangerousness" rests on
open-ended phrases such as "likely to result in serious harm," and
[placing others] in reasonable fear of serious harm." In a federal
criminal case, Justice Douglas condemned vague statutes in no
uncertain terms:
The vice of vagueness in criminal statutes is the treachery
they conceal either in determining what persons are included
or what acts are prohibited. Words which are vague and
fluid may be as much of a trap for the innocent as the ancient
law of Caligula. 20
Just as due process of law requires that criminal statutes be
sufficiently definite in their terms to provide an ascertainable
guide to conduct, due process must also require more definite
standards under the mental hygiene codes.2' Confinement and
loss of liberty are the results in either case.
17. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. at 737 (footnotes omitted).
18. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 51.75, art. 11(e) (West Supp. 1971).
19. For additional examples cf. LINDMAN & MCINTYRE, supra note 6.
20. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952) (citation omitted).
21. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d
891, 901 (D.C. Cir. 1970), where the court stated that, "[it is the importance
of the right to the individual, not the technical distinction between civil and crim-
inal, which should be of importance to a court in deciding what procedures
are constitutionally required in each case."
[Vol. 13
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Lack of Due Process
A person adjudged "mentally ill" may be detained on a
mere probability that he could be dangerous; no showing of ac-
tual dangerousness is required. Persons are often detained under
civil commitment codes in the absence of an actual assault or
any evidence of preparation or conspiracy to commit a dan-
gerous act. One can be committed simply on the basis of his state
of mind-that is, for "dangerous tendencies" that are perceived
by others as probably leading to acts of an unknown character
or indeterminate consequence at an unspecified place and time,
against an unspecified victim. This is simply preventive deten-
tion. Confinement on such a tenuous basis is an arbitrary and un-
reasonable deprivation of liberty contrary to the precepts of pro-
cedural due process. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court, although
recognizing to some extent the danger of administrative abuses
and of denial of procedural due process, has stated that there is
nothing vague or patently defective in a statute which permits
confinement on account of dangerous tendencies, at least where
the statute requires evidence of past conduct to support any deter-
mination of dangerousness. 2
2
Denial of Equal Protection
The standards for determining dangerousness which lead
to precautionary detention without safeguards are not only vague
but are applied only to persons who are alleged to be mentally ill.
Other citizens who are known to be potentially dangerous to
themselves or others cannot be detained in this preventive way.
For instance, reckless or drunken automobile drivers usually must
have several convictions for actual crimes before they may be
denied the privilege of driving, let alone their physical freedom.
By comparison, the dangerousness of the "mentally ill" seems
negligible.2" It could be argued, therefore, that the civil deten-
tion of a "mentally ill" person for dangerousness is an invidious dis-
crimination amounting to the denial of equal protection. Not even
equal protection issues, however, have seriously tarnished the con-
stitutional respectability of mental hygiene codes.
22. Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
23. Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Prac-
tical Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1108, 1128 (1972).
See also ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, SPECIAL COM-
MITrEE ON THE STUDY OF COMMITMENT PROCEDURES AND THE LAW RELATING TO
INCOMPETENTS, MENTAL ILLNESS, DUE PROCESS AND THE CRIMINAL DEFEND-
ANT 59 (1968); Ennis, Civil Liberties and Mental Illness, 7 CRIM. LAW BULL.
101, 110 (1971).
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Invasion of Privacy
Just as the due process and equal protection issues inherent
in these codes have generally remained uncontested, the issue
of the right to privacy of the allegedly mentally ill person has
been similarly neglected. Privacy in this sense includes privacy
of the mind.
Two Supreme Court cases, Griswold v. Connecticut24 and
Stanley v. Georgia,2 5 center attention on privacy within one's own
home. The results in these cases were reached by different
routes. In the former, the Court held that the police power of the
state, as applied in a state penal statute, interfered with the right
to marital privacy. This right was found to have its basis in the
ninth amendment and in the penumbras of specific guarantees of
the Bill of Rights. In the Stanley case the Court relied primarily
on the first amendment. Justice Marshall, speaking for the
majority, struck down a state obscenity statute which made the
private possession of obscene material a crime on the rationale
that such a statute amounted to governmental control of one's
thoughts and intrusion upon the privacy of one's mind. The Court
stated that "[Olur whole constitutional heritage rebels at the
thought of giving government the power to control men's
minds."2 6  Specifically, the Court held that the state "cannot
constitutionally premise legislation on the desirability of control-
ling a person's private thoughts. 27  The reference to "men's
minds" and "private thoughts" may be a significant indication
that the Court is concerned with freedom of private thought as well
as freedom of public expression of ideas, which the Court has often
upheld under the first amendment. This decision potentially pro-
tects the mental activity of a person alleged to be mentally ill from
government interference, particularly when his public behavior is
otherwise socially tolerable. However, to our knowledge no court
has passed on the freedom of private thought with respect to men-
tally ill persons.
Neither the first nor the fourth amendments has so far been
accepted as a bar to government intervention in the lives of men-
tally ill persons, although courts insist constantly that the police
power is subject to constitutional limitation.2 8 Government in-
tervention is most remarkable in those cases of "madness" which
are manifested primarily in personal tensions and family con-
24. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
25. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
26. Id. at 565.
27. Id. at 566.
28. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
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flicts. The present proclivities of the state to invade the pri-
vacy of mentally ill persons contrast sharply with the opinion re-
garding privacy offered by Justice Brandeis in his widely quoted
dissent in Olmstead v. United States: 9
.. . [The framers of the Constitution] sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions, and
their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be left alone-the most comprehensive right
and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon
the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
30
Mental hygiene laws often have the effect of converting private
and personal conflicts into public concerns, thereby trampling
constitutional barriers to the invasion of privacy.
Lack of Constitutional Accountability
The mental hygiene system has escaped strict accountability
by constitutional standards. Madness and the mad have tradi-
tionally been exempted from constitutional protection. The lack
of freedom of choice implied in the judgment that one is, in some
sense, "mentally ill," is made tangible by the law, which pre-
sumes that the person who is partially incapacitated is best as-
sisted by depriving him of all liberty.
Some steps forward have been made in peripheral areas. For
example, in 1972 New York State revised its mental hygiene code
to include "rights" for mental patients. 3 1  However, innovations
in this area amount to procedural alterations rather than the addi-
tion of a substantive "bill of rights." Deviance is no longer a
sanctioned excuse for depriving a person of all his rights under
the law.3" But in a constitutional democracy this sort of progress
begs the question. The true focus of concern should be whether
mental hygiene codes regard the allegedly "mentally ill" person
as a person to whom total constitutional guarantees apply. This
leads us to an examination of the doctrine of "balance" underly-
ing contemporary commitment procedures.
29. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
30. Id. at 478.
31. N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAw § 15 (McKinney 1972). The statute
stipulates the protection of mental patients' civil rights including but not limited
to voting and the right to possession and use of property. The statute also
specifies a right to suitable, skillful, safe and humane treatment administered
with full respect for a patient's dignity and personal integrity.
32. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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THE DOCTRINE OF "BALANCE"
The key to understanding present handling of the mentally
ill appears to use to be the doctrine of "balance." For example,
Justice Rabin used the doctrine in justifying narcotics commit-
ments:
The problem presented is one of balancing the interest of
society [against] the rights of the individual . . . [I]n almost
every case where the State exercises its police power in an
attempt to meet and cure a condition that is found to be
dangerous to society as a whole, there is some impingement
on civil rights. . . If the State acts reasonably in the exercise
of its power and does not go beyond what is necessary to
meet the condition presented, then we may say that its
action may be sustained from a constitutional standpoint.3 ,
The authority of the state to restrict or abridge the civil lib-
erties of citizens in our liberal democracy is generally constrained
by our Constitution and by legal precedent. States must bear a
heavy burden of justification when they attempt to interfere
with certain civil liberties. The mentally ill, however, seem to
have been regarded as an exception to these protections. Co-
ercive powers of the state need only be exercised "reasonably";
no special burden of justification is placed on the states.
The difference in treatment stems in part from diametrically
opposed views of criminal law and commitment law to which a
substantial segment of the legal profession and the public sub-
scribe.
The criminal law is reflective of western society's adherence
to the idea of free will, the power of choice. As such it is
particularly solicitous to afford the individual every oppor-
tunity to evercise that power, i.e., to act in a manner other-
33. In re Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 29 App. Div. 2d 72, 75, 285
N.Y.S.2d 793, 797 (1967), rev'g In re James, 54 Misc. 2d 514, 283 N.Y.S.2d
126 (Sup. Ct. 1967). This case involved a direct confrontation on constitu-
tional grounds over the specific section of the 1966 mental hygiene law which
provides for the compulsory treatment of narcotic addicts in New York. The
lower court had declared the section unconstitutional. The appellate court, in
an opinion by Justice Rabin, reversed. Cognizant of the civil liberties dimension,
Justice Rabin discussed the powers of the state in the context of the balance doc-
trine (although the decision was based on other grounds). In a concurring opin-
ion Justice Capozzoli stated:
It must be remembered that the purpose of the statute under considera-
tion is not to punish those who come within its terms as narcotics ad-
dicts, but, rather, to concentrate on curing them. It is purely a civil
proceeding and the rules applicable to the enforcement of criminal law
should not apply to this type of proceeding. 29 App. Div. 2d at 79, 285
N.Y.S.2d at 801.
The outcome of the balancing test in this case was the usual, predictable one-
the affirmation of compulsory treatment laws at the expense of the liberty of the
patient.
[Vol. 13
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wise than that suggested by all available indicia. Conversely,
commitment law postulates an absence of any meaningful
power of choice. Thus, commitment is viewed not as a
deprivation of freedom, but rather as a means to prevent
inevitable conduct. To allow an individual to remain in
society once it is established that he suffers from a mental
illness likely to make him a danger to himself or to his neigh-
bors would be, it is assumed, both unwarranted and uncon-
scionable. [footnotes omitted]3 4
The failure of courts and legislators to recognize the fun-
damental rights which are denied one who is committed is also
important. Parallels simply are not drawn from protection of
other civil liberties to protection of the rights of involuntary men-
tal patients. Courts are very solicitous of fundamental rights
in other contexts, such as freedom of association or travel. In
reviewing legislation which abridges those rights, courts require
that the state show it has chosen the alternative least restrictive
of these rights to accomplish its legitimate goals.85  But no such
requirement of minimal interference with civil liberties exists
in the case of the mentally ill. Such persons are routinely com-
mitted to mental institutions even in cases where very minor in-
fringements on their freedom would be sufficient to satisfy state
interests.86
It is not surprising, therefore, that those for whom the doc-
trine of balance has the greatest meaning (aside from the mentally
ill) are those who are charged with making decisions regarding
commitment in particular cases-policemen, health officials, judges,
jurymen (occasionally), and psychiatrists. The art of "balancing"
the needs of society and the needs of individuals by officials armed
with relatively unqualified powers of detention, has contributed to
the production of an authoritarian rather than libertarian mental
hygiene system. The interests of society, or more correctly, the
state, as interpreted by officials of the state, characteristically
carry the day. Let us now examine the weighing scales more care-
fully in order to see more precisely what in fact is weighed.
The Weighing Scales
On one side of the scales are the "interests of society"-
sought to be secured from the dangerousness or harmful activ-
34. Projects Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 820, 827
(1967).
35. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960). For a thorough and excellent discussion of the principle
of "least restrictive alternative" as applied in commitment of the mentally ill see
Chambers, Alternatives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: Practical
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, 70 MicH. L. REv. 1107, 1145-1154 (1972).
36. Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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ity of the "mentally ill." But is it really "society" which the law
attempts to protect?
The truth of the matter is that a specific person may be in
conflict with other specific persons and individuals may en-
danger each other and one another's property. Among those
designated as mentally ill are individuals who, like others in the
population at large, are liable to and do inflict injury in various
ways on family members, neighbors, working associates, and
strangers. This is the "society" in danger, and the menace is
precisely that posed by any criminal activity. Society in this sense
is protected by the criminal law. Through diverse meansures of
law enforcement, the state endeavors to safeguard the lives and
property of its inhabitants, but it cannot completely secure life
and property. The most severe dictatorships have not elimi-
nated simple human larceny. The criminal law neither elimi-
nates criminal acts altogether nor gives criminals free rein. It
rather strikes a balance between freedom and security which is tol-
erable to most of us. To insure a measure of security, the law pro-
scribes various acts. It is these acts which can be explicitly pro-
hibited to all persons, including those considered "mentally ill."
Yet the mentally ill are the only category of potential offenders for
whom preventive detention is accepted as a matter of course.
Although the problem is usually phrased in terms of "dan-
gerousness," the triggering concern is really that the mentally ill
are often just plain nuisances.8 7  Like many other individuals,
they generate family crises, disrupt classrooms in schools, gen-
erate tension in employment units, or pester and sometimes frighten
pedestrians. Their activities touch raw nerves, and sometimes
their antics are exhausting physically and emotionally, eliciting
sharp and bitter reactions. The modern family, school, occupa-
tional setting, and neighborhood are so functionally specialized
that the standards for correct social conduct and role performance
are very detailed, specific and inflexible. Inefficiency, lack of
discipline, nonproductivity, and other forms of deviance are
poorly tolerated. It is against these rigid contexts that "mental
37. In a review article on dangerousness, Bernard Rubin states: "It is
unlikely that dangerousness can be predicted in a person who has not acted in a
dangerous or violent way." Rubin, Prediction of Dangerousness in Mentally Ill
Criminals, ARCH. GEN. PsYCHIAT. 405 (1972). The knowledge that a person ispotentially dangerous to himself or others is based on fact of violence or other-
wise dangerous acts of the past. Mental illness per se is not indicative of danger-
ousness. We believe that the impact of mental illness is most often limited to
private or interpersonal difficulties. This claim is based on fifteen years of
experience in clinical practice (Dr. Daly) and on similar experiences recorded
by other psychiatrists in psychiatric literature. A recent review of this literature
can be found in the Rubin article, Id.
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illness" or "need for retention" or "dangerousness" are tested.
Commitment, rather than protecting society from the dangerous,
merely enforces conformity to socially accepted roles.
The interests of society under the balance doctrine are, when
carefully investigated, essentially familial and contractual inter-
ests.38 Those injured have ample remedies available, including
injunctions and restraining orders when warranted. Yet it is not
these interests which physicians, hospital directors, legislators,
judges, and policemen are asked to protect when considering
whether or not to commit a person alleged to be mentally ill, but
rather "society" in general.
On the other half of the balance-the second pan of the
scales of justice-are the interests of the mentally in-their lib-
erty and their personal welfare. Freedom of choice is the hall-
mark of liberty. Civil commitment law presumes that the capacity
to choose is impaired by mental illness and that the state may
need to limit personal choice in order to protect the welfare of the
individual. Commitment abrogates the right of the person com-
mitted to act as a free agent in a society of free agents, and em-
powers officials of the state to manage him as a nonagent. 9
Deprivation of rights, or permission to exercise rights, occurs in
relation to the severity of the illness and the course of treat-
ment, and in relation to other factors peculiar to mental hospitals.
Restoration of certain liberties is often promised to induce coop-
eration with the authorities. The promise of the right to be at
liberty is employed to manipulate and influence the patient who
is regarded as an independent agent for the purpose of curing
him within the hospital but as a nonagent for purposes of deter-
mining his own release.
Under the "balance" doctrine the individual's liberty and
his personal well-being are treated as severable and antagonistic.
The view taken is that, while the sacrifice of liberty may be a high
price to pay for personal welfare, the sacrifice of that welfare may
be an even more exorbitant price to pay for freedom.4"
38. See generally Alexander & Szasz, From Contract to Status via Psychiatry,
13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 537 (1973).
39. Even when the courts make every effort to scrupulously protect the rights
of the individual, commitment delivers the person into the hands of other
branches of government which are poorly staffed. While understaffing is also a
problem in penal institutions, mental patients are more completely dependent on
the institution staff for actualizing their rights since they have fewer legal pro-
tections. In this setting even sensitive officials are frequently prone to neglect
the rights of detainees. Visits by magistrates to state hospitals to hear com-
plaints by inmates do little to remedy the situation. See generally Szasz, Justice
in the Therapeutic State, 3 IND. LEGAL F. 19 (1969).
40. Cf. Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. N.D. 1971) and In
re Narcotic Addiction Control Comm'n, 29 App. Div. 2d at 75, 285 N.Y.S.2d at
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Equally questionable is the assumption that welfare and liberty
are antagonists. It is not welfare that demands concessions from
liberty; it is coercion that confronts the liberties of citizens which are
guaranteed by the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. Commit-
ment and coercive treatment programs stand in contradiction to both
liberty and faring well for the individual. By what measure has
coercion a better claim than liberty to advancing the well-being of
a person? If a balance is to be struck at all, then it is a balance
between coercion and liberty. At present that balance is several
degrees on the side of paternalism and the coercive authoritarian
practices sanctioned by the law. The doctrine of "balance" does
not rescue the mental hygiene system from constitutional limbo.
Nor has it nurtured a just substitute for due process, equal protec-
tion, and the right to privacy. A few courts have tried to elevate
a "right to treatment" thesis into a constitutional necessity for in-
voluntary mental patients,4 but the findings in these cases beg the
constitutional question as to whether such treatment can justify the
concomitant deprivation of liberty. In addition, this thrust will
almost certainly lose its cutting edge in the impasse between the
judiciary that continues to order commitment and legislatures that
control the flow of sufficient resources for the humane treatment
of the hospitalized population.
While the doctrine of balance implies reasonableness, equity,
and fair play, it has helped to produce imbalance and inequity
with regard to the mentally ill. The scales are continually tipped
against the involuntary detainee. Nothing is really weighed; the
person alleged to be mad loses his liberty, other individuals are
rid of a nuisance, and the result is often an increment in suffering. 42
The solution must be to deal with behavior, not with thought
processes, and to accord determinations of socially intolerable be-
havioral deviance the constitutional protections of the criminal
prosecution.
797. In the Wyatt decision Justice Johnson states:
To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory
that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail
to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due
process. 325 F. Supp. at 785.
Under the view expressed by Justice Johnson, deprivation of liberty would bejustified if adequate treatment were given.
41. Wyatt v. Stickney, 334 F. Supp. 1341, 1343 (M.D. Ala. N.D. 1971). Cf.
Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.24 943, 949 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (concurring
opinion).
42. For introduction to the literature on the adverse effects of incarceration
in mental hospitals and asylums, see JOINT COMMISSION OF MENTAL ILLNESS AND
HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL HEALTH 9-23 (1961), and E. GOFFMAN, AsY-
LUMS (1961).
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CONCLUSION
The doctrine of "balance" as it is currently understood and
applied to the mentally ill is unsound. It is used to deprive those
adjudged to be mentally ill of liberty without sufficient justifica-
tion.
The option still open to legislators and judges is to assume a
"civil liberties" stance. In this mode of legislative and judicial
thinking, the state shall detain no one except for the commission of
a crime and then only in accordance with the procedural due pro-
cess requirements applicable under the criminal law. No per-
son shall be detained by the state without his consent merely
because he is believed or diagnosed to be mentally ill and con-
sidered to be in need of treatment, harmful to himself, or danger-
ous to others. Surely it is the constitutional obligation of the state
to ensure equal treatment under the law rather than to show favor-
itism towards those "normal" beings who stand to gain from the
incarceration or restriction of others. Deference to social wisdom
and common sense can lead to this solution no less than to any
other one.
For a society that has habitually put away its mentally ill, the
transition to a legal philosophy that affords constitutional guar-
antees for those alleged to be "mentally ill" will entail many
awkward and uncomfortable moments. Such a change would
call for sophisticated thinking about tolerance of bizarre behavior
and about our social responsibilities pertaining to deviant persons
and their activities. By adopting a strict constitutional stance with
respect to the mentally ill, the United States can take a long step
toward approximating the ideals of liberal democracy.43
43. The authors are grateful to Professor Travis H.D. Lewin, College of
Law, Syracuse University, who thoughtfully and generously offered suggestions
for much needed improvement in the manuscript. He is in no way responsible
for the themes, techniques, arguments, or conclusions to be found in this article.
Acknowledgment is also due the anonymous authors of Civil Commitment of the
Mentally Ill: Theories and Procedures, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1288 (1966).
1973]
